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No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest
The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War
Non-Alignment
✣ Svetozar Rajak
The First Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM),
held in Belgrade in September 1961, launched a movement that has now ex-
isted for more than 50 years. The movement became the voice of many Third
World governments and, for a time at least, posed a challenge to Cold War bi-
polarity.
Despite the NAM’s historical uniqueness and signiªcance, remarkably
little has been written about its origins.1 How, for example, did a quest for ac-
tive peaceful coexistence and non-commitment to blocs evolve into an insti-
tutionalized movement? This article aims to give the NAM greater promi-
nence in the historiography of the Cold War by demonstrating that the
Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito and Yugoslav diplomats played an important,
perhaps crucial, role in the conceptualization of the idea of non-engagement
and in the establishment of the NAM. An explanation of the origins of non-
alignment is impossible without a comprehensive analysis of the global pro-
cess of decolonization that was taking place in the 1950s and 1960s and the
diverse political, historical, and cultural heritage that inºuenced actions of
the leaders of Yugoslavia, India, Egypt, Indonesia, and other Asian and Afri-
1. A notable exception is Alvin Z. Rubinstein’s seminal book Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), which remains an invaluable contribution to the
scholarship of the NAM in the Cold War. Yugoslav archival sources that were unavailable to
Rubinstein conªrm some of his arguments but contravene others. My analysis here goes be-
yond Rubinstein’s and offers new insights into several key issues such as the strategic choices and di-
lemmas the Yugoslav leadership faced after 1948, the true beginnings of Yugoslavia’s non-commitment
to blocs, the signiªcance of Tito’s ªrst trip to India and Burma for the development of the global “non-
engagement” initiative, and the conceptualization of the guiding principles behind the new initiative.
This in no way diminishes the importance and relevance of Rubinstein’s work. On the contrary,
I deem the book essential reading on the topic of non-alignment in the master’s course I teach at the
London School of Economics.
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can countries that sought non-engagement. These wider developments lie be-
yond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, by shedding light on the rationale,
motives, and considerations that drove Tito and his aides to pursue the risky
road of non-commitment to blocs, the article can contribute to an under-
standing of the origins of non-alignment. The intellectual and political delib-
erations that steered Yugoslavia toward non-commitment are representative of
the considerations that made this option appealing to Third World countries.
The main aim here is to offer a reinterpretation of the origins of Yugosla-
via’s road to non-alignment and elucidate the roots and conceptualization
of Tito’s strategic reorientation. Contrary to the views of some analysts that
Tito’s intransigence was the casus belli of the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1948, the
evidence cited below indicates that Belgrade’s foreign policy became truly in-
dependent only after Yugoslavia’s excommunication from the Soviet fold. Fur-
thermore, the article shows that Belgrade began searching for a “third way”
earlier than is acknowledged in the relevant historiography. The search began
when, faced with the distinct threat of a Soviet invasion in the early 1950s,
Yugoslavia became all but formally incorporated into the Western alliance.
Based on previously unknown or inadequately researched documents from
the Yugoslav archives, the article also demonstrates that Tito’s trip to India
and Burma in December 1954, particularly his ªrst encounter with India’s
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, played an exceptionally signiªcant role in
the conceptualization of the principles of active peaceful coexistence and non-
commitment and in transforming them into a global initiative. Lastly, the ar-
ticle highlights the political and philosophical rationale behind the principles
that became embedded in the concept of non-engagement and, later, non-
alignment.
A preliminary note of clariªcation is worthwhile. Although “non-
alignment” was ªrst mentioned in Tito’s and Nehru’s joint statement issued
on 22 December 1954, the terms used at the time to depict the new foreign
policy initiative were “active peaceful coexistence,” “non-commitment,” and
“non-engagement.” “Non-alignment” became universally accepted toward
the end of the 1950s, especially after the Belgrade conference in 1961. As
much as possible, the discussion here adheres to this etymology.
The Roots of Yugoslavia’s Independent Road
Tito became leader of Yugoslavia through the struggle against Nazi occupa-
tion during World War II and in the coterminous civil war, achieving a domi-
nant position in Belgrade by 1945. Like thousands of Communist revolution-
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aries around the world, he and his closest aides ªrmly believed in Iosif Stalin’s
infallibility and tried to replicate Stalinist institutions and practices as closely
as possible. At an extraordinary plenum of the Yugoslav Communist party’s
Central Committee in mid-1948, Tito discussed the accusatory letter he had
just received from Stalin and Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and
said: “This letter is the result of horrid defamations. False reporting. . . . If the
comrades from the Central Committee of the [USSR’s All-Union Commu-
nist Party] would ask for the transcript [of this meeting], we will send it to
them.”2 In July 1948, several weeks after being expelled from the Communist
Information Bureau (Cominform) on the basis of Stalin’s allegations, Tito de-
clared at the Fifth Congress of the Yugoslav Communist party: “The Com-
munist Party of Yugoslavia has to date honorably fulªlled its historical mis-
sion and . . . will prove through its unshakeable loyalty to the science of Marx-
Engels-Lenin-Stalin that it has not strayed from the road of this science.”3
Some historians, however, argue that Tito’s “deviations” from Soviet foreign
policy line were a major factor in the Yugoslav-Soviet rupture in 1948.4 The
focus of this article does not allow for a more detailed analysis of such inter-
pretations.5 However, evidence in the Yugoslav archives indicates that prior to
Yugoslavia’s expulsion from the Soviet bloc Tito was ideologically and politi-
cally committed to Stalinism and Stalin’s policies. As the most doctrinaire of
the East European “peoples’ democracies,” Yugoslavia was ªrmly embedded
in the Soviet bloc and was considered the most loyal among the Soviet satel-
lites. Stalin awarded the Yugoslav Communists a prominent role at the forma-
tive meeting of the Cominform in 1947. Moreover, Belgrade was chosen as
the site of the new organization’s headquarters.
Manifestations of Tito’s autonomous actions prior to the rift in 1948
must not be mistaken for an independent foreign policy. The Yugoslav leader
possessed an uncanny ability to adapt his actions to circumstances, which
148
Rajak
2. Excerpts from the record of the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia (CPY), Belgrade, 12–13 April 1948, are quoted in Vladimir Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948:
Knjiga prva [Documents of 1948: Book One] (Belgrade: Rad, 1979), pp. 225–238.
3. Peti kongres KPJ: Stenografske beleske [Fifth Congress of the CPY: Transcripts] (Belgrade: Kultura,
1949).
4. See, for example, A. B. Edemskii, Ot konºikta k normalizatsii: Sovtsko-yugoslavskie otnosheniya v
1953–1956 godakh (Moscow: Nauk, 2008).
5. The limitations of this article do not allow for a more elaborate discussion of the causes of the 1948
Tito-Stalin split. For my views on the issue, please refer to Svetozar Rajak, Yugoslavia and the Soviet
Union in the Early Cold War: Reconciliation, Comradeship, Confrontation, 1953–1957 (New York:
Routledge, 2011); and Svetozar Rajak, “The Cold War in the Balkans, 1945–1956: From the Greek
Civil War to Soviet-Yugoslav-Normalization,” in Melvyn P. Lefºer and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The
Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. 1: Origins (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2010), pp. 145–162.
served him well in overcoming the insurmountable odds he frequently faced
in his life and long political career. Tito was also blessed with a peasant’s sur-
vival instinct that often helped him miraculously wriggle his way out of dire
situations during his interwar covert activities as a Communist International
operative and head of the Yugoslav Communists and his wartime role as the
leader of the anti-Nazi partisans. Reminiscing about his personal trepidations
on the eve of the fateful meeting of the Yugoslav party’s Central Committee
on 12 April 1948, which was to decide whether to accept or rebut Stalin’s ac-
cusations, Tito told his ofªcial biographer: “Life had taught me that in such
critical moments, it is most dangerous to be without a position, to hesitate. In
such a situation, one must always react with boldness, resolutely.”6 These per-
sonal traits and acquired skills distinguished Tito from other Comintern-
groomed “international cadres.” As a trained operative working throughout
Europe prior to the Second World War and particularly as the Yugoslav resis-
tance leader during the war, Tito was often forced to make on-the-spot deci-
sions in response to the circumstances surrounding him.
The archival evidence and accounts of Tito’s companions suggest that un-
til the 1948 confrontation with Stalin the Yugoslav leader’s willingness to ac-
commodate the general principles of “socialist construction” to the domestic
circumstances and idiosyncrasies in his country was based on the conviction
that such actions were in the spirit of the existing Moscow “line,” in accor-
dance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, and necessary to
expedite the realization of the goals of the international proletarian move-
ment. Whenever Tito’s actions met with Stalin’s disapproval, the Yugoslav
leader adhered to his “internationalist duty,” fell into line, and followed direc-
tives from Moscow. Often quoted examples of Tito’s intransigence prior to
1948, such as the Trieste crisis in 1945 or Tito’s territorial demands over
Carinthia and Trieste at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, conªrm that
Tito in the end always dutifully accepted Stalin’s diktat.
In June 1948, having been excommunicated from the socialist fold, Tito
found himself left out in “the cold.” Based on his Communist outlook and
the developments on his border with Italy at the time, he sensed that the West
was intent on “swallowing” his regime. Faced with a gargantuan struggle for
survival, Tito was forced to contemplate distancing Yugoslavia from both
blocs, which he now saw as equally threatening. Stalin’s banishment pushed
Tito into the void between the two Cold War alliances, where he was con-
fronted by simultaneous threats from both East and West. On 18 and
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6. Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biograªju Josipa Broza Tita [New Supplements to the Biography of
Josip Broz Tito], Vol. 1 (Zagreb: Mladost, 1980), p. 479.
19 March 1948, the Yugoslav leader received two consecutive démarches from
Moscow announcing the withdrawal of Soviet military and civilian advisers
from Yugoslavia. As a pretext, Moscow accused the Yugoslav authorities of
preventing Soviet advisers from carrying out their duties. A second letter from
Stalin and Molotov, sent on 27 March, contained an even longer list of accu-
sations, signaling a deªnite rift with the Yugoslavs. On 12 and 13 April, Tito
convened the Yugoslav Communist party’s Central Committee to gain sup-
port for his dramatic decision to refute Stalin’s accusations.7 After emotionally
charged and, at times, hostile exchanges with Sreten Zujovib-Crni, the promi-
nent revolutionary and member of the Yugoslav Politburo who was advising a
conciliatory response to Stalin, Tito eventually secured the backing of his
Central Committee. At one point, Tito shouted at Zujovib-Crni, “Crni, you
have given yourself the right to love the USSR more than I do. . . . You want
to shatter [the Yugoslav party’s] unity; you want to divide [the party’s] leader-
ship. . . . Comrades, our revolution does not devour its own children. The
children of this revolution are honest.”8 The Yugoslav party’s decision to reject
Stalin’s accusations was a turning point in the history of the international
Communist movement. For the ªrst time, a small European Communist
party dared to confront Stalin, the “undisputed Leader of the socialist camp.”
On nearly the same day that the initial accusations arrived from Moscow,
the Yugoslav regime received a threat from the West. On 20 March 1948, the
U.S. and British governments jointly announced their decision to allow Italy
to take over the administration of their zone of the Free Territory of Trieste.
This transfer was a clear breach of the peace treaty with Italy, signed by the
victorious powers—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the
Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia—at the Paris Peace Conference in February
1947, which stipulated that changes to the status of the territory could be
made only if agreed to by all signatories.9 Yugoslavia’s opposition to the resto-
ration of Italian sovereignty nearly provoked an armed confrontation with
both Italy and, eventually, other Western powers. Tito’s room for maneuver
was severely limited. Much of his domestic political capital was invested in the
promise that Trieste would become part of Yugoslavia. The loss of Trieste
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7. Corresponding documents, in Archive of Josip Broz Tito (AJBT), Cabinet of the President of the
Republic (KPR), I-2 / 4-2. See also Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biograªju Josipa Broza Tita [The
New Supplements to the Biography of Josip Broz Tito], Vol. 3 (Belgrade: Izdavacka radna organizacija
“Rad,” 1984), pp. 220–228.
8. Dedijer, Dokumenti 1948, pp. 225–238.
9. The text of the peace treaty with Italy, signed in Paris on 10 February 1947 is in Dokumenti o
spoljnoj politici Socijalisticke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije: 1947 [Documents on the Foreign Policy
of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia: 1947] (Belgrade: Savezni sekretarijat za inostrane
poslova / Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu / Jugoslavenski pregled, 1984), Vol. I, pp. 125–
185.
threatened to erode his domestic popular support at the very time he needed
it for the impending confrontation with Stalin. Given the extraordinary
Soviet intelligence penetration of the British government, Stalin may have
timed his attack on Tito to coincide with the anticipated Anglo-American
declaration on Trieste. Thus, when Tito and his aides decided in April 1948
to resist Stalin, they had little alternative.
Stalin’s banishment and Yugoslavia’s struggle for survival in a bipolar
world order that was intolerant of dissent left Tito’s regime in international
isolation. At ªrst, Western governments were not ready to accept that the
Tito-Stalin public spat was anything but a ruse. On the other hand, the lack
of precedents and, more importantly, the ideological myopia of Tito and his
associates induced them to believe they would be restored to Stalin’s good
graces once he understood that the accusations against them had been fabri-
cated. Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders’ genuine dedication to Communist ide-
ology and hope of once again being under the safety of the Soviet security
umbrella made them determined not to do anything that could jeopardize the
interests of the international proletarian movement, even if this meant endan-
gering their own existence.10 Their stance on the matter was not simply the re-
sult of Comintern-induced indoctrination. It derived from an unconditional
commitment to the “cause,” the very same belief that prompted the victims of
Stalin’s purges in the USSR to admit responsibility for completely fabricated
crimes while being led to their deaths.
In the autumn of 1949, however, the prospect of imminent Soviet attack
became real. The anti-Yugoslav propaganda intensiªed, and armed provoca-
tions along Yugoslavia’s borders with the Soviet-bloc countries became a daily
occurrence. Furthermore, high proªle trials against prominent leaders
throughout Eastern Europe gave the anti-Titoist campaign an alarming mo-
mentum. These ominous developments disabused the Yugoslav leaders of
their last remaining hope that the conºict was the result of mere “misinforma-
tion” and a “family quarrel” that would soon be resolved, prompting them to
contemplate a new strategic option.11
Tito ªnally crossed his Rubicon in December 1950. Following China’s
entry into the Korean War, he turned to the West for arms and economic aid.
The Yugoslavs saw the escalation in Korea as Stalin’s decoy and testing of wa-
ters for a Soviet intervention against Yugoslavia.12 Belgrade’s foreboding was
further augmented in subsequent months by an unprecedented Soviet-bloc
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10. Record of the CPY CC Politburo meeting, 30 August 1949, in Archive of Yugoslavia (AJ), Archive
of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (ACK SKJ), 507/III/42.
11. Transcript of the Third Plenum of the CPY Central Committee (CC), 29–30 December 1949, in
AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7.
12. Record of the CPY CC Politburo meeting, 4 December 1950, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/53.
military build-up and multiplication of “military exercises” on Yugoslavia’s
borders following Stalin’s rearmament initiative in January 1951.13 From then
on until the full normalization with the Soviet Union in 1956, Yugoslavia
gradually incorporated itself into the Western defense system. Its strategic use-
fulness was rewarded by generous U.S. military and economic aid. Western,
namely U.S., military assistance on an unprecedented scale enabled Yugosla-
via to build capabilities against the Soviet and East European threat. At the
same time, economic aid, in particular the U.S. food relief program, helped
Tito’s regime escape large-scale famine and economic and social collapse
in the early 1950s.14 From 1950 to 1955, Yugoslavia received more than
$700 million in economic aid and close to $1 billion in military aid.15
Despite this dependence on U.S. arms and food deliveries, Tito resisted
pressure to bring Yugoslavia formally into the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation (NATO).16 He perceived association with the West as only a temporary
marriage of convenience.17 Tito was convinced that irrespective of his cooper-
ation and a de facto military alliance against the USSR, the West would never
cease to entertain hopes of changing the character of his regime. He warned
his Yugoslav comrades: “They see in us a Communist country. They want to
make a Satellite out of us.”18 When Soviet pressure intensiªed in Decem-
ber 1949, Tito insisted at the meeting of the Yugoslav party’s Central Com-
mittee that “it is particularly important now, in light of the [changed Yugo-
slav] position toward the imperialist world that we, especially younger
members of the party do not forget that we are a socialist country.”19 To Tito,
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13. Mark Kramer, “Stalin, the Soviet-Yugoslav Split, and Soviet Efforts to Reassess Control: A Reas-
sessment,” in Svetozar Rajak, ed., The Balkans and the Cold War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014).
14. Tito’s report to the Sixth Congress of the CPY/League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY),
Zagreb, 3 November 1952, published in Borba, 4 November 1952, p. 1; and transcript of Yugoslav-
Soviet talks in Belgrade, 27–28 May and 2 June 1955, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-56.
15. National Intelligence Estimate 31–55, “Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation,” 23 February
1955, in U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Electronic Reading Room (www.foia.cia.gov, hence-
forth cited as CIA-ERR). See also the collection of documents in “From National Communism to Na-
tional Disintegration: US Intelligence Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990,” conference
organized by the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the National Intelligence
Council, 7 December 2006, Washington, DC). Documents from this collection are now available on-
line at CIA-ERR.
16. Record of the meeting of the Executive Committee of the Central Committee of the LCY, 27 No-
vember 1952, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/III/61.
17. Transcript of the Meeting of the LCY Executive Committee, 19 July 1954, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/
III/62a.
18. Record of the meeting of the LCY Executive Committee, 27 November 1952, in AJ, ACK SKJ,
507/III/61. See also the record of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY, 16 May
1953, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/II/10.
19. Transcript of the Third Plenum of the CPY Central Committee, 29–30 December 1949, in AJ,
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7.
international isolation was perhaps the most threatening consequence of the
1948 expulsion from the Cominform.20 Ostracized, under economic block-
ade, and subjected to ªerce propaganda attacks from Yugoslavia’s former pa-
trons in Moscow, and with the West initially reluctant to offer full support,
the Yugoslav leaders found themselves alone and exposed. Such complete iso-
lation from both blocs was unique during the Cold War. A U.S. intelligence
report from the mid-1950s concluded: “Since June 1948 . . . [Yugoslavia’s] in-
ternational position has been anomalous.”21 Tito was forced to learn a lesson
he would never forget, namely, that he must avoid relying exclusively on one
bloc. Although excommunicated from the Marxist-Leninist camp, the Yugo-
slav leaders never entertained illusions that they would be safe in the opposite
bloc. When justifying the establishment of relations with the West at the
Third Plenum of the Central Committee in December 1949, Edvard Kardelj
emphasized that leaders in Belgrade were determined not to allow the
[the West] to bargain with the Soviet government at [Yugoslavia’s] expense . . .
[Yugoslavia] must not come into the situation when, for example a sudden deci-
sion by the American government to cancel our purchases would completely
halt the economic development of our country. We must shield ourselves from
any such surprises. 1948 and 1949 must never happen again.
At this point, Tito interjected: “The experience in the East must be an abject
lesson.”22 Having suffered for taking a stand against Soviet hegemony in their
own bloc, the Yugoslavs were determined not to fall prey to the same pressure
on the other side. The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) concluded at
the time: “The dominant concerns of [Tito’s] regime will almost certainly re-
main those of insuring its own survival and avoiding foreign domination.”23
Indeed, this became the driving force and principal rationale behind Yugosla-
via’s effort to remain outside both blocs. Expulsion from the ideological fold
and perception of a threat from both the East and the West induced Tito to
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20. Ibid; and Tito’s report to the Sixth Congress, published in Borba, pp. 1–2. See also the record of
the meeting of the LCY Executive Committee (renamed Politburo), 27 November 1952, in AJ, ACK
SKJ, 507/II/61.
21. National Intelligence Estimate 31–55 (see note 16 supra).
22. Transcript of the Third Plenum of the CPY Central Committee, 29–30 December 1949, in AJ,
ACK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/II/7. Kardelj, Tito’s second-in-command, the regime’s ideologue, and, until
1953, Yugoslavia’s foreign minister, frequently served as the promulgator of new ideas at meetings of
the Politburo and Central Committee. However, he was not the originator of these ideas; rather, he
was just ofªcially transmitting proposals that had already been discussed by Tito and three or four of
his most trusted aides. Besides Kardelj, the core group included Aleksandar Rankovib, Tito’s ofªcial
deputy and head of the security apparatus. Tito often used Kardelj to test out new concepts with the
wider party and state leadership.
23. National Intelligence Estimate 31–55 (see note 16 supra).
maintain a distance from both blocs. The ensuing international isolation
prompted him to search for allies.
The Yugoslav regime did not abruptly stumble into non-alignment, nor
did the concept occur to Tito as an epiphany. It was the result of a gradual
process of rationalization that, on the one hand, required an analysis of the
changes under way in the international system, and, on the other hand, took
account of the reality that Belgrade’s foreign policy options were conditioned
by circumstances outside its control. Dependent on the West for protection
from the Soviet threat and for economic survival, Tito had to play his cards
carefully. Thus, the initial deliberations about the road between the two blocs
were conªned to Tito and his innermost circle.24 While contemplating a new
foreign policy strategy, Tito occasionally found it necessary to reassure Wash-
ington. In January 1953 he “solemnly declared” to the U.S. ambassador in
Belgrade that “[isolationism and neutralism] were abhorrent both to him and
to his people.”25 Several years had to pass before Belgrade was able to con-
ceptualize the new approach and identify possible allies. Most importantly,
a favorable shift in the “correlation of forces” surrounding Yugoslavia had
to occur before Tito and his aides could pursue a new foreign policy orienta-
tion. The conceptualization of Yugoslav non-engagement underwent three
phases. The ªrst involved secretive high-level discussions which concluded
that independence from both Cold War alliances was possible by playing one
against the other. Traumatized by the isolation that followed the split with
Stalin, Tito and his associates also understood that the new strategy was im-
possible without the fulªllment of two conditions. On the one hand, Yugosla-
via would need to secure international support for its new foreign policy posi-
tion. On the other hand, the new strategic option was possible only after the
Soviet threat had been eliminated or sufªciently defused. During the second
phase, Yugoslav leaders identiªed possible allies in the quest for non-commit-
ment to either bloc. The third phase began with Belgrade’s shift away from
the West in the autumn of 1954. Taking advantage of the opening created
by the incipient normalization of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake
of Stalin’s death, Yugoslav leaders felt emboldened to begin establishing con-
tacts with possible allies in Asia. During a visit to India in December 1954,
Tito publicly declared Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy orientation for the ªrst
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partment of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 1333–1335.
time. He set out to elaborate a rationale for a policy of non-commitment to
blocs and to win backers for it.
Conceptualization: Yugoslavia in Search of Policy
and Allies
The Yugoslav strategy of playing one bloc against the other was contrived
from discussions within Tito’s innermost circle. In the nascent Cold War sys-
tem, there were no precedents or models for the Yugoslavs to emulate. The
notion of “[taking] advantage of the existing rivalry in the World, in order to
secure [Yugoslavia’s] survival and further consolidation” was ªrst broached to
a wider circle of the Yugoslav leadership by Kardelj at the party’s Central
Committee plenum in December 1949.26 Symptomatic of the deliberations
that were taking place at the time was Tito’s indiscretion in front of the U.S.
ambassador in Belgrade, George V. Allen, six months later. Provoked by Al-
len’s criticism of Yugoslavia’s “passivity” in the United Nations (UN) follow-
ing the outbreak of the Korean War, Tito responded that “[Yugoslavia] would
rather be ostracized for being an independent country than end up in the pit
of one of the blocs.”27 The concept of a “third way” was taking shape gradu-
ally. Speaking on Korea at the Fifth UN General Assembly, in the autumn of
1950, Kardelj proclaimed that
the people of Yugoslavia cannot accept the postulate that humanity today has
only one choice–a choice between a domination of one or the other bloc. We be-
lieve that there exists another road. True, it may be a difªcult one but, at the
same time, it is an unavoidable one. It is the road of democratic struggle for a
world in which people are free and equal, for democratic relations between na-
tions that would eliminate outside interference in internal affairs of nations, and
for a full peaceful cooperation between nations based on equality.28
Kardelj’s statement revealed an embryonic notion that a position between the
two blocs was possible. At a Politburo meeting held on 5 December 1950, a
day after the Yugoslav leadership made a monumental ideological U-turn and
decided to seek U.S. military aid, he proposed that the time had come for Yu-
goslav foreign policy to free itself from the single-minded focus on “us [Yugo-
slavs] and the Russians.” Echoing this, the Politburo decided to set up a top
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26. Third Plenum of the CPY CC, Transcript, 29–30 December 1949, in AJ, ACK SKJ, 507/IX, II-7.
27. Record of the CPY Politburo meeting, 28 June 1950, in AJ, 507/II/49.
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is quoted in Leo Mates, Nesvrstanost: Teorija i savremena praksa [Non-Alignment: The Theory and
Current Practice] (Belgrade: Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, 1970), p. 216.
quality research institute that would provide, free of any ideological tunnel vi-
sion, expert insights into the politics and economics of the outside world and
the opportunities offered to Yugoslavia.29 In the autumn of 1953, at the apex
of the Trieste crisis, Tito’s top aides reasserted the position that Yugoslavia
must “make better use of current [international] relations and existing global
antagonisms.”30 This balancing act was a risky venture, however. On the one
hand, the new strategy was designed to avoid jeopardizing the continuation
of Western support against possible Soviet aggression. On the other hand,
the goal was to create the necessary leeway from either bloc and prevent
East-West accommodation over Yugoslavia. Tito’s almost panicky reaction to
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 conªrms a fear that never
left him, namely, that an East-West accommodation would provide the
Soviet Union with a blank check to settle scores with Yugoslavia once and
for all.
Yugoslav leaders were determined never to repeat the lesson of 1948—
the country’s complete international isolation and nearly fatal vulnerability.
Tito and his aides understood that they would need international support
and allies if they were to use the rivalry between the two ideological camps
to forge an independent position from both. Looking for support, the Yugo-
slavs ªrst turned to those most proximate to their still prevailing ideological
Weltanschauung—to the non-Communist European Left. This in itself was a
major departure from the existing Stalinist paradigm, which stipulated that
West European Socialists and Social Democrats were the “lackeys” of the
bourgeoisie and a more dangerous enemy than the capitalists themselves. At a
June 1950 Politburo meeting, Kardelj optimistically identiªed “new tenden-
cies” akin to a “new movement” within the traditional European Socialist and
Social Democratic parties that could provide backing for Yugoslavia’s new po-
sition.31 The Yugoslav party leaders set out to establish or strengthen their re-
lations with several of these parties, ªrst and foremost with the West German
Social Democratic Party (SPD), which was the most prestigious and the one
with the longest tradition. The ªrst contact occurred on 12 March 1952,
when Vladimir Dedijer, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the
Yugoslav parliament met Erich Ollenhauer, the successor to the ailing SPD
president, Kurt Schumacher. From then on, the Yugoslav ambassador in
Bonn, Mladen Ivekovib, maintained regular contacts with Ollenhauer and
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other prominent SPD ofªcials, especially Willy Eicher and Fritz Heine.32 In
February 1953, representatives from a European and Asian Socialist and So-
cial-Democratic parties were ofªcially invited to the Fourth Congress of the
Yugoslav Popular Front. Speaking at the congress, Kardelj appealed to the So-
cialists to back Yugoslavia’s “road,” and Dedijer urged them to stop support-
ing either superpower because both were locked in a struggle for global su-
premacy.33 Before long, however, the Yugoslavs realized it was one thing for
the West European Socialist and Social Democrats to support Belgrade
against Moscow and quite another for them to renounce their allegiance to
the Western alliance.
After the disappointment with the West European Left, Yugoslav leaders
saw Third World countries and the ex-colonial domains that had recently
gained independence as the only remaining alternative. But with the process
of decolonization still in its infancy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it was
difªcult to distinguish who among the new nationalist political movements
and personalities in these countries was truly independent of their ex-colonial
masters. More importantly, Belgrade at the time knew very little about the
Third World. Upon returning from his ªrst trip to India and Burma, Tito ad-
mitted to having had “very limited knowledge about these countries.”34 Worse
still, the ideologically minded Yugoslav leaders all too easily fell victim to Eu-
rocentric and Marxist sectarian stereotyping of the Third World. Many of
Tito’s aides considered it untoward and unwise to link Yugoslavia with what
his then Chief of Army Staff, Koca Popovib, and Deputy Foreign Minister
Veljko Mibunovib dubbed “the world of miserables.” Kardelj also initially op-
posed collaboration with the “feudal lords” who, in his opinion, ruled the
newly liberated colonies. It was certainly very difªcult to identify allies in
the Third World who were willing to stand apart from both blocs and
against the nascent Cold War order at its most contested juncture. In a mo-
ment of doubt, Kardelj admitted in 1951: “A third force is not possible. The
only possibility for a socialist country like ours is to exploit the contradictions,
which emerge in one or in the other camp.”35 Nonetheless, despite the skepti-
cism and frustration, the search for allies continued. By the end of 1951, Yu-
goslav leaders shifted their focus toward the Asian ex-colonies. In the autumn
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of that year, at a meeting of the heads of departments of the Yugoslav Foreign
Ministry, Josip Djerdja, who had just returned from his posting as the ªrst
Yugoslav ambassador in New Delhi, suggested that Yugoslavia could rely
more on the newly liberated colonies, particularly India, as a way out of inter-
national isolation. Kardelj, presiding as the foreign minister, immediately in-
terrupted the meeting and informed Tito via a secure phone line that Djerdja
had come up with some interesting ideas about a foreign policy strategy
“along the lines we have been discussing.” Tito promptly ordered both to his
nearby residence for further deliberations.36
Several considerations ensured that Asia and particularly India became
the focus of Belgrade’s attention. The Korean War and debates at the UN pro-
vided Third World countries with an opportunity to voice opposition to the
existing Cold War divisions. Most prominent and proactive among these were
the newly liberated countries of Asia; especially, India, Burma, and Indonesia.
They took the lead in drafting and tabling resolutions aimed at preventing the
spread of the Korean War and at reducing tensions in Asia. During 1950 and
1951, Yugoslavia and India often found themselves taking similar positions
on a number of UN initiatives and resolutions. In September 1950, Yugosla-
via supported India’s proposal regarding the People’s Republic of China’s UN
membership. A month later, both countries abstained from voting on the
Eight Nation resolution calling for UN troops to cross the 38th parallel. This
record suggested to the Yugoslavs that India harbored a similar outlook on the
international situation. Another factor that made some Asian countries attrac-
tive to Yugoslavs—a factor that largely escaped historians’ attention—was the
two countries’ ideological proximity.37 In the early 1950s, Socialist parties
played a prominent role in the political life of several Asian countries, includ-
ing Burma, India, and Indonesia. The establishment of the Asian Socialist
Conference in January 1953 in Rangoon reinforced the impression of the
ascendency of Socialism in Southeast Asia. Belgrade dispatched a high-proªle
delegation, headed by Milovan Djilas, the regime’s ideologue and a member
of Tito’s innermost circle, to attend the conference. The delegation brought
back valuable insights and information about Asia. This, in addition to more
qualiªed reporting from higher-caliber diplomats now being posted to several
Asian countries, such as Josip Djerdja and Joze Vilfan in India, helped to dis-
pel the Yugoslav leadership’s initial ideologically tainted reservations regarding
the “feudal” leadership in these countries.38 As Tito admitted in an interview
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for the Belgian magazine Le Peuple upon his return from India and Burma,
“when we embarked upon ªnding a ‘modus-vivendi’ [between the two Blocs]
who could we turn to in the ªrst place if not to Asian countries?”39
Although the two countries formally established diplomatic relations on
5 December 1948, relations between Yugoslavia and India remained embry-
onic until 1954. Indian suspicions about Yugoslavia’s true non-engagement
credentials were probably to blame for this. Before 1948, India regarded Yu-
goslavia as a Soviet satellite and in the early 1950s, after Belgrade started re-
ceiving military aid from the United States, India viewed Yugoslavia as a
member of the Western bloc.40 Leaders in New Delhi could not contemplate
that a small European country receiving extensive Western economic and mil-
itary aid could remain outside the Western bloc. Until the autumn of 1954,
India was represented in Belgrade by its ambassador in Rome, further proof of
how little it valued its relations with Yugoslavia. Belgrade, on the other hand,
was keen to improve links with New Delhi and appointed high-caliber diplo-
mats as ambassadors to India. Djerdja, the deputy foreign minister, served as
Yugoslavia’s ªrst ambassador to India from April 1950 until the autumn of
1951. Vilfan, Djerdja’s successor, became a highly inºuential chief of Tito’s
cabinet upon his return from India in March 1953.41 In November and De-
cember 1952, Belgrade dispatched a fact-ªnding “mission of good will” to In-
dia. In January 1953, after returning from the First Asian Socialist Conference
in Rangoon, Djilas and Aleš Bebler, the Yugoslav deputy foreign minister, vis-
ited New Delhi. Yugoslavia’s pronounced interest and the rationale behind it
were clearly elaborated in an assessment report on India’s foreign policy and
international position, a report compiled by Yugoslav Foreign Ministry ex-
perts ahead of Tito’s visit in 1954. The report concluded that with a huge
population, crucial geostrategic position, and rich cultural and historic heri-
tage India was poised to play a major role in the world, particularly in Asia.
Yugoslav experts pointed out that India’s foreign policy engagement and inter-
national prestige “far exceeded its current economic and military strength.”42
This seemed to corroborate the notion that a country could play a role in
global politics beyond the limitations imposed by its economic and military
resources and capabilities—something that clearly appealed to Tito and his
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aides, who believed that a prominent role in international affairs would help
Yugoslavia withstand subjugation by either superpower. The report also listed
numerous principles of India’s foreign policy that further strengthened its
ability to pursue an independent course: mutual cooperation between coun-
tries, non-interference in the affairs of others, opposition to the existing blocs,
and anti-colonialism.43
However, the Yugoslavs had to tread with extreme caution when contem-
plating a foreign policy detour. Yugoslavia could ill afford to be seen as neu-
tralist by the United States, its security guarantor and the provider of an eco-
nomic lifeline. As long as there existed a “clear and present danger” of Soviet
aggression, Yugoslavia’s struggle to remain outside the two blocs had to be
played out as a subtle balancing act. Yugoslavia struggled to avoid formal link-
age to NATO without endangering its security imperative to remain within
the Western defense system and under the U.S. security umbrella.
The pivotal change in the “correlation of forces” that ªnally allowed Yu-
goslavia to embrace a new strategic orientation occurred in the summer of
1954. After six years of an increasingly ominous Soviet threat, including daily
border clashes, an economic blockade, propaganda warfare, and international
isolation, the summer of 1954 brought the unexpected prospect of a normal-
ization of relations with the USSR. Out of the blue, Belgrade received a letter,
dated 22 June and signed by Nikita Khrushchev, the First Secretary of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), on behalf of the CPSU Cen-
tral Committee. This was the ªrst direct communication between the Soviet
and Yugoslav leaders since the 1948 rupture. The letter proposed the normal-
ization of relations and initiated a secret correspondence between the two
leaders.44
By early November 1954, several of Moscow’s public goodwill gestures,
coordinated through the secret correspondence, convinced Tito and his asso-
ciates that the Soviet initiative was genuine and that the prospect of the re-
moval of the Soviet threat was real.45 The normalization of relations with the
USSR offered Tito the much-hoped-for maneuvering space to curtail depend-
ence on the West and to carve out for himself an equidistant position from
both blocs. Tito admitted this causality in his 7 March 1955 report to the
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Yugoslav parliament on Yugoslav foreign policy and on his ªrst trip to Asia:
“The principles of active co-existence became particularly clearly manifested
in our foreign policy only with the creation of objective conditions that made
such a policy possible.”46 The truly unanticipated and astounding normaliza-
tion with Moscow coincided with the apex in Belgrade’s relations with the
West. During the summer and early autumn of 1954, Yugoslavia fulªlled
its primary strategic goals that were conditional upon Western support. On
9 August 1954, after eighteen months of negotiations, the Balkan Pact be-
tween Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was signed. The pact provided Yugosla-
via with Western security guarantees against a Soviet attack without formal
NATO membership. At the same time, the long-standing dispute with Italy
over Trieste was resolved to Yugoslavia’s satisfaction. On 5 October, Italy and
Yugoslavia signed in London a ªnal agreement on Trieste with three Western
powers as co-guarantors. Thus, Tito’s trip to Asia in December 1954 came af-
ter the long-standing Soviet threat had ªnally been defused and at a time
when Yugoslavia had achieved a highly favorable strategic position vis-à-vis
both superpowers.
Conceptualization: Active Peaceful Coexistence and
the Like-Minded
In the early summer of 1954, Tito was still pondering a trip to Burma, his
ªrst intended journey to the Third World. Burma was chosen because Yugo-
slav leaders saw it as a fulcrum of the nascent socialist movement in Asia. As
such, it appealed to the Yugoslavs’ still limited and ideologically tainted un-
derstanding of the Third World. The Burmese Socialist party of Ba Swe was
the most prominent political force in the country and played a leading role in
the creation of the Asian Socialist Conference in Rangoon in January 1953.
Moreover, during the Rangoon Conference Djilas received a formal invitation
for Tito to visit Burma. In September 1953, Burmese Prime Minister U Nu
renewed the invitation in a conversation with the Yugoslav ambassador in
Burma. Belgrade accepted the invitation but replied in a rather ambiguous,
noncommittal manner that the visit “could not be scheduled earlier than the
end of 1955.”47 By mid-1954, with no plans for a visit to India, the political
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value of a trip to Asia that would have Burma as the only destination was still
apparently under debate within the Yugoslav leadership.
The reduction of tensions with Moscow and the signing of the Balkan
Pact and the Trieste Agreement allowed Tito to go to Asia. However, the exact
itinerary and the agenda were inºuenced by two additional developments in
the summer of 1954. The ªrst was a dramatic change in India’s attitude to-
ward Yugoslavia, which opened the door for a visit to India. The Indian shift
was probably spurred by recent developments on the subcontinent. In Febru-
ary 1954, India’s archrival Pakistan had strengthened its military ties with the
West by signing the Pact of Mutual Cooperation with Turkey, a precursor to
the Baghdad Pact. This, and the fact that Nehru was aware of Tito’s possible
visit to Rangoon, could explain the timing of the ªrst Indian fact-ªnding mis-
sion to Yugoslavia, which took place in the summer of 1954 and was headed
by Nehru’s sister, Virjaya Lakshmi Pandit. During her visit, Pandit traveled
extensively through Yugoslavia and engaged in comprehensive exchanges with
Tito and other Yugoslav ofªcials. Her reports provided Nehru with perhaps
his ªrst detailed insight into Yugoslavia’s domestic political system and, more
importantly, its foreign policy aspirations. The report apparently allayed his
remaining suspicions about Yugoslavia’s independence from both blocs. At
the end of her visit, Pandit ofªcially invited Tito to visit India “before or after
his visit to Burma.”48 A few weeks later, in a conversation with Gojko Nikoliš,
the Yugoslav ambassador in New Delhi, Nehru reiterated the invitation, em-
phasizing that India “is a huge country” and that the length and itinerary of
the visit would be at Tito’s convenience.49 In October, a month before Tito
departed for Asia and as a follow-up to Pandit’s visit, the ªrst Indian ambassa-
dor to Yugoslavia arrived in Belgrade.
The second event that inºuenced Belgrade’s preparations for the Asian
trip were the talks held with Emperor Haile Selassie I of Ethiopia, who visited
Yugoslavia at the end of July 1954. This was Tito’s ªrst encounter with the
leader of a prominent Third World country. This visit by an absolutist mon-
arch of a feudal state was in itself a sign of changes in Belgrade’s approach in
international relations, conªrming that the Yugoslavs had largely discarded
their ideological blinkers about the Third World. After speaking with Selassie,
Tito had a much better grasp of the expectations and emerging ambitions of
the growing community of independent ex-colonies in Africa and Asia. More
important, the surprising scope and character of assistance requested by the
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Ethiopians made Tito aware of the magnitude of inherited problems in the
Third World and the enormous possibilities for cooperation. Selassie pro-
posed comprehensive collaboration and asked for large-scale Yugoslav techni-
cal assistance in mining, forestry, agriculture, education, and military produc-
tion.50 The encounter with Selassie enabled the Yugoslavs to identify two
important aspects that profoundly shaped their future approach to the Third
World. First, it convinced them that economic development was a prerequi-
site for a Third World country to achieve true sovereignty. Second, it demon-
strated that Yugoslavia’s economy could greatly beneªt from the provision of
technical assistance and industrial exports to Third World countries. The
talks with Selassie helped Tito to prepare concrete proposals for economic and
military cooperation when he met the Burmese leaders in Rangoon six
months later.
Tito departed on a two-and-a-half-month-long voyage to Asia on his
yacht Galeb on 30 November 1954. He emphasized in a report to the Yugo-
slav parliament after his return that the main goal of the trip had been to “ac-
quaint ourselves and to strengthen ties with the countries who, like us, strive
for peace, with the aim to act jointly.”51 Between his arrival in New Delhi on
17 December and his departure for Burma from Calcutta on 3 January, Tito
visited fourteen Indian cities by train or car, acquainted himself with the cul-
ture and customs of India, and called on numerous factories, hospitals, mili-
tary barracks, and universities. His days were ªlled with meetings and conver-
sations with ofªcials, academics, and public ªgures, as well as with ordinary
workers and poor peasants. Tito, a passionate hunter, even went on a tiger
hunt.52 More importantly, Tito and Nehru got to know each other personally.
Besides four ofªcial rounds of talks, the two leaders spent much time in pri-
vate conversation between ofªcial meetings and engagements or over private
dinners. The ªrst round of talks between the Indian and Yugoslav leaders was
held on 18 December, in Nehru’s New Delhi residence.53 Tito and Nehru
were alone, with Tito’s chief of cabinet acting as the translator. At Tito’s re-
quest, all further ofªcial talks were held with members of the Yugoslav delega-
tion and Indian ofªcials in attendance.
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During this ªrst meeting, Tito presented his views on an array of foreign
policy issues, whereas Nehru limited himself to occasional remarks, mainly
when China was mentioned. Tito ªrst addressed Yugoslav-Soviet relations,
conªding that he was in secret correspondence with Soviet leaders to follow
up on their initiative for an improvement in bilateral relations. He claimed
that Nehru was the ªrst foreign leader to be informed of this correspondence.
Tito then emphasized that Yugoslavia had gone along with Moscow’s initia-
tive only because the Soviet Union had indirectly accepted responsibility for
the 1948 conºict and agreed to normalization based on non-interference
in Yugoslavia’s affairs. He defended his non-aligned credentials by insisting
that Yugoslavia had not joined NATO when it signed the Balkan Pact; its aim
was only to fend off the very real threat of Soviet aggression. Tito said that the
improvement of relations with the USSR would allow Yugoslavia to give pri-
ority to economic and political rather than military, aspects of the pact. Tito
then reproached his Balkan Pact ally, Turkey, for its aspirations to play the role
of a regional hegemon. He added that during his recent visit to Ankara he had
made a point of inquiring with his hosts whether the new Turkish-Pakistani
treaty of cooperation was directed against India. The Turks, Tito reported,
had assured him that the treaty was not directed against India.54 He then pro-
vided an overview of the situation in Europe, singling out the question of
Germany as the most important foreign policy issue of the moment. Nehru
refrained from commenting, but toward the end of the meeting he inquired
about Yugoslavia’s relations with China. The Indian leader informed Tito that
during Zhou Enlai’s recent visit to New Delhi the Chinese premier had ex-
pressed support for the establishment of relations with Yugoslavia. Tito re-
sponded that Yugoslavia was not opposed to this.55 He evidently wished to
impress and woo Nehru. By disclosing the existence of secret contacts with
Moscow, the Yugoslav leader wished to convey to his Indian host a feeling of
respect and trust. Tito also tried to present himself as a friend of India and was
particularly keen to reiterate his non-aligned credentials by minimizing the
relevance of the Balkan Pact and its links to NATO.
Several hours after the ªrst meeting, a second ofªcial session was held
during which Nehru outlined India’s foreign policy views. From the outset, he
stressed that India was not a member of any military alliance, insisting that
the Commonwealth could not be regarded as an alliance insofar as member-
ship carried no legal obligations. At the same time, he stressed, Common-
wealth membership helped India to acquire better international recognition
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and to retain inºuence in global politics. According to Nehru, on more than a
few occasions India’s views had prompted Great Britain to change its position
in the UN.56 Nehru barely mentioned Pakistan apart from making a passing
comment that Karachi’s policies were not helping to diminish the existing
frictions between the two countries. He admitted that Kashmir remained the
biggest and perhaps the only problem between them. Nehru mentioned Eu-
rope only in passing, justifying India’s passivity toward European issues by
stating that India had “no wish to impose itself on European problems.”57
Most of the prime minister’s presentation during the second meeting, how-
ever, was reserved for China. He informed Tito that during Zhou’s recent visit
to New Delhi the two countries had pledged to cooperate despite differences
in their political systems. Tito interrupted Nehru, asking whether the Chinese
could be trusted and whether Moscow was not behind Zhou’s visit. Nehru
disagreed and reiterated his belief that Beijing had its “own feeling for Asia.”
Furthermore, he was convinced that Moscow was not “too happy” with the
Chinese foreign policy initiatives and revealed that Soviet ofªcials had ap-
proached him with a proposal for a joint declaration supporting the ‘‘‘Five
principles,’ as if they wished to diminish the importance of Zhou and
[Nehru’s] joint statement in which [they] pledged their adherence to these
principles.”58 Nehru then focused on India’s relations with China, emphasiz-
ing that the two countries shared a border stretching more than 2,000 miles,
including Tibet. He was conªdent there was no danger of Chinese aggression,
pointing to the geography of their shared border, which stretched across the
world’s highest mountains. Nehru was also conªdent that China did not want
war, and he emphasized that Chinese sovereignty over Tibet was never in
question. He accused the British of creating “certain privileged positions in
Tibet that were then inherited by India but which India, from the very begin-
ning, was aware it was not in a position to maintain.” However, Nehru said
that when he recently spoke with Zhou Enlai and others in Beijing, he had
“encouraged the Chinese to recognize Tibetan individuality by allowing a cer-
tain kind of autonomy for Tibet.” Returning to Tito’s earlier question about
the sincerity of Chinese foreign policy, Nehru disclosed that both he and
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U Nu had expressed strong anxieties to Zhou about Beijing’s support of Com-
munist parties throughout Asia.59 Nehru’s accentuated conciliatory attitude
toward China suggested his satisfaction with the results of his meeting with
Zhou. His insistence on talking only about Asian affairs indicates his predom-
inantly regional focus.
Most of the third ofªcial meeting between Tito and Nehru, held on
20 December, was again dedicated to China.60 Nehru blamed the UN for its
stance on recent trials in China and the sentencing of U.S. prisoners of war
(POWs) on charges of espionage. He said it was wrong to condemn China
without hearing its side of the story. He disclosed that he had recently medi-
ated between the UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld, and the Chi-
nese and had advised Beijing to accept Hammarskjöld’s offer to visit China.
Tito disagreed with Nehru, suggesting that it was inappropriate for the
Chinese to declare POWs spies. Tito harbored strong suspicions about
the “Chinese trials,” reminding Nehru that “[the Yugoslavs] have had experi-
ence with these sorts of show trials, for example the trial against Laszlo Rajk
[in Hungary].” Tito also feared that the Chinese action might be used by
“aggressive elements in the West” to provoke tensions in the region. In this
context, he stressed India’s crucial role in preventing and easing such adverse
developments. Referring to possible cracks in the Sino-Soviet relations, Tito
observed that
it looks sometimes as if the Soviets are against the Chinese entry into the UN.
There is certainly some kind of change in the Soviet policy [toward China]. One
should look back into previous experiences. The [Yugoslav] conºict with
Cominform had its roots in, among other things, East European [socialist]
countries’ tendencies for closer relations with Yugoslavia that were becoming in-
creasingly apparent at the time. It was precisely [Tito’s visit to Romania in
December 1947] and the outpourings of overwhelming public sympathies for
the Yugoslavs that signaled the beginning of the Soviet campaign [against
Yugoslavia].61
With little ªrst-hand knowledge of China, Tito was still convinced that
Beijing and Moscow did not constitute a united front in Asia and that China’s
regional policies were more independent than was actually the case. Nehru’s
tone when speaking about China revealed the positive impact on China’s
neighbors of Beijing’s peace offensive and Zhou’s constructive diplomacy.
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Tito, on the other hand, was probably eager to hear about the ªrst Chinese
foreign policy foray outside the Soviet shadow, not so much because he be-
lieved that China would welcome non-commitment to blocs, but because it
could help him understand better the motives behind the most recent Soviet
initiative to normalize relations with Yugoslavia.
On 21 December, on the eve of a fourth meeting with Nehru, Tito ad-
dressed the Indian Parliament. He used the occasion to deliver a program
speech that would deªne and promulgate Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy ori-
entation. The speech revealed a surprisingly developed Yugoslav conceptual-
ization of non-engagement and active peaceful coexistence. As the four main
threats to peace, Tito identiªed inequality among states and nations, the in-
terference of the big powers in the affairs of other states and peoples, the divi-
sion of the world into spheres of interest and blocs, and colonialism. The Yu-
goslav leader insisted that non-committed countries needed a global rather
than regional approach to activism. He stressed that non-engagement meant
maintaining equidistance from the two blocs, arguing against the tendency of
the newly liberated ex-colonies to regard the USSR as the lesser of two evils.
Tito also stressed that trade and economic cooperation between non-engaged
countries was a good way to achieve rapid industrialization and emancipation
from old colonial masters.62 The Yugoslav leader used the speech to inject ac-
tivism into the concept of non-engagement borne out of traditional Asian
neutralism. He promoted “active coexistence” based on functional coopera-
tion, involvement in the peaceful settlement of international crises, and the
removal of obstacles to cooperation between states. That same evening, after a
private dinner in the Indian prime minister’s residence, the two discussed the
draft of the joint statement, and Tito suggested that the word “active” be
added in describing India and Yugoslavia’s “positive and constructive policy of
non-alignment.”63 Although hesitant at ªrst, Nehru accepted the insertion the
next morning.64
The joint statement, signed on 22 December, articulated the aspirations
of the new and emerging force in the international system—the non-engaged
countries.65 In the statement, the two leaders declared their intention to “de-
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vote their energies . . . toward the advancement of peace through negotia-
tions, and reconciliation as the means for the resolution of international
conºicts.” Tito and Nehru also clariªed that “the policy of non-alignment
with blocs, which they pursue, does not represent ‘neutrality’ or ‘neutralism’;
neither does it represent passivity as is sometimes alleged. It represents the
positive, active and constructive policy that, as its goal, has collective peace as
the foundation of collective security.” The statement then spelled out the
principles of interstate relations that India and Yugoslavia were determined to
promote—the recognition of individual sovereignty, independence and integ-
rity, non-aggression, equality, respect, non-interference in the affairs of other
states, and peaceful coexistence. The document denounced allegations in the
Western media that countries seeking to be non-committed to the blocs
would themselves form a “third bloc.” Finally, in one of the most important
declarations of the statement, Tito and Nehru expressed hope that the “prin-
ciples of relations between countries that they have proclaimed would acquire
a wider, universal implementation.”66 By including this passage, they were sig-
naling their intention not only to work actively toward the implementation of
the principles they had just endorsed but also to encourage a wider following.
This aspect and the timing of the joint statement were of particular impor-
tance. Published ahead of the April 1955 Bandung conference of the Asian
and African countries, the document acquired additional signiªcance and
meaning because it articulated the rationale behind the forthcoming gather-
ing and helped to deªne the aspirations of the non-committed countries.
The second leg of Tito’s trip to Asia took him to Burma. Tito held four
rounds of ofªcial talks with the Burmese prime minister, U Nu, and other
ofªcials. During their second meeting, on 13 January, U Nu informed Tito
about his trip to Hanoi, emphasizing that “the people of North Vietnam are
ªercely loyal to their Communist leaders and in particular to Ho Chi Minh,”
and that “the American intervention in South Vietnam will end in disaster
and for a very simple reason: Despite American weapons, despite American
dollars and despite American military assistance, no one in South Vietnam is
willing to die for the Americans.”67
U Nu spoke at length about China and the talks he had held with Mao
Zedong and Zhou Enlai during his recent visit to Beijing. He expressed fasci-
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nation with the changes that had occurred in China since he was last there,
before the Second World War. According to U Nu, “before liberation, the
Chinese people walked with their backs bent and with fear in their eyes when-
ever they would meet a foreigner. Now, they walk upright, like men.”68 He
then stressed that, contrary to the opinion of many of his own people, he had
become convinced that the Chinese Communist Party was strong and en-
joyed the support of the Chinese people. The Burmese leader justiªed the vio-
lence used by the Communists: “It is true that the Communists killed a lot of
people and mistreated others when they took over power. However, the peo-
ple they treated this way were not good people but black marketeers, spies,
proªteers, and the like. For this reason the Chinese masses did not hate the
new Government. On the contrary, they started supporting it.”69 He con-
cluded by noting that Mao and Zhou had assured him that, “because of the
huge program of domestic development, they do not want to go to war with
anyone.” U Nu’s explanation of the current state of affairs between China and
Burma caused Tito to express reservations and provoked an interesting ex-
change:
U Nu: Until recently, the Burmese Government was of the opinion that the Chi-
nese were aiding and assisting the rebels here. . . . When Zhou Enlai visited
Rangoon last year, I told him that we do not like what they were doing
and if they wish to have good relations with us it had to stop. Zhou re-
sponded that he had no idea about any of this and that the Chinese Gov-
ernment is not interested in internal affairs of Burma. I have decided to ac-
cept his explanation.
Tito (interrupting): As if the left hand doesn’t know what the right one is doing.
U Nu: When I visited China, I addressed this question again with Mao Zedong
and Zhou Enlai. I explained to the Chinese that Burma is not an American
tool and is following a foreign policy which is completely independent
from America. The Chinese had to admit this was true. I have also told
them that Burma does not allow the Americans to build bases on its terri-
tory, and the Chinese admitted it was true. I have also told them that . . .
Burma had given active support to China, namely with regard to the ad-
mission of China to the UN. The Chinese have admitted this as well and
have said that having all that in mind, it would not be correct for them to
keep supporting the insurgents in Burma. After this, I returned to Burma
with the belief that the Chinese will not interfere any more in our affairs.
Tito: How could [the Chinese leaders] say that they will not give further support
[to insurgents] and yet Zhou Enlai had said that he knew nothing about it?
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U Nu: Well, they did not say it explicitly, but I had acquired such an impression.
They continued to say they did not give assistance to rebels, and I have
come to believe that they would not give it in future.
Tito: I am not convinced they will not meddle in your affairs in the future. It is
in the logic of a big power.70
During their fourth meeting, on 14 January, Tito discarded as an illusion
U Nu’s earlier suggestion that the Soviet Union and China were better or
more moral than the West. According to Tito, both blocs were driven by self-
interest and pure greed. He shared, however, U Nu’s opinion that the United
States intended to establish itself ªrmly in Asia. Tito warned that U.S. mo-
tives were not only ideological but imperialist and noted that
[U.S.] imperialism is not classic imperialism manifesting itself in the armies
marching in, conquest without particular reason, etc. but through a completely
different method of penetration and conquest. American imperialism is not as
dangerous to Europe as it is for Asia because the Asian countries are much more
underdeveloped than Europe. [The Americans] achieve their goals through eco-
nomic measures, through aid.71
U Nu’s later observations about the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
(SEATO) provoked a sarcastic response from Tito:
U Nu: SEATO is a strange organization. All hitherto military alliances, includ-
ing NATO, had pledged to defend themselves only. However, SEATO is
determined to defend other states, as well, including those that have not
joined it. Burma is also in the sphere of their guarantees.
Tito: Indeed, the wolf is keen to embrace the lamb to “protect” it.72
Struck by what he saw as U Nu’s naïveté, Tito insisted that the division of the
world into blocs was, by its very nature, a danger for smaller countries and
that the competition between the two blocs threatened their very existence:
Between themselves, [the Soviet Union and the United States] have undertaken
to divide the world. From the American side, this is done under the pretext and
slogans of the ªght against the spread of communism; from the other side, it is
done in the name of the struggle for the Revolution, for social change in which,
of course, the Soviet Union has to play the leading role. Both are equally danger-
ous. I do not know which is in fact more dangerous for the small nations.73
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The Yugoslav also warned of China’s emerging role. He argued that, as a big
country, China inevitably had its own interests that it wished to pursue and
attain.
I have already voiced some reservations while Mr. Nu was speaking about
China, namely whether China has its own aspirations here, in Burma. I believe
that it may not have them today—although I do not trust a single big country
because every one of them harbors imperialistic appetites, Western countries as
well as the Soviet Union. However, it is very possible that in the future, when it
becomes industrialized and more developed, China will appear in the same light
[as the other two global superpowers]. History is full of such examples.74
Two further meetings between the Burmese and the Yugoslav leaders
focused on military and economic cooperation and demonstrated Tito’s in-
tent to promote activism over traditional concepts of neutralism. Earlier, on
11 January, after a military parade held in his honor, Tito asked to spend
some time in conversation with the present Burmese army ofªcers.75 He of-
fered advice on aspects of military organization, from the size of infantry divi-
sions to the type of weapons best suited to the Burmese army and Burmese
terrain. Tito argued that small, non-engaged countries like Burma and Yugo-
slavia should build up their military capabilities in order to discourage the su-
perpowers’ attempts to dominate them. The Yugoslav leader further claimed
that non-engaged countries should buy weapons from both blocs while devel-
oping their own production of light weaponry. In this context, he suggested
closer cooperation and, in response to a direct question from one of the Bur-
mese ofªcers, conªrmed Yugoslavia’s willingness to supply light weapons,
train Burmese ofªcers, and send advisers to Burma.76 During the follow-up
meeting on the morning of 14 January, Tito again maintained that “Burma,
like any other small country, has better chances to secure its independence if it
has resources to defend it.” He reminded his hosts that Yugoslavia was able to
resist the Soviet threat only because it possessed a strong army, adding that
“no improvement of international relations or various initiatives for disarma-
ment could lull me; I believe that it is still better to be armed and have a
strong army than wait for others to disarm.”77 A so-called special statement,
issued together with a joint statement at the end of Tito’s visit, announced
that the Yugoslav president had offered, “as a gift,” to arm a brigade of the
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Burmese army and that in “accepting this generous offer with gratitude” the
Burmese government had decided “to offer in return, as a gift, rice for the
people of Yugoslavia.”78 This arrangement also inaugurated barter as a mecha-
nism to facilitate Yugoslav-Burmese trade and served as a template for future
South-South cooperation, helping the non-aligned countries overcome the
perennial obstacle to economic cooperation between them: their inability to
ªnance mutual trade. The talks with the Burmese on economic and military
cooperation reºected Tito’s conviction that mutual reliance and cooperation
among Third World countries was the only way for them to defend their sov-
ereignty and independence.
Conclusion
Yugoslavia’s non-commitment to the Cold War alliances was borne out of its
international isolation and life-and-death struggle for survival following its
expulsion from the Cominform. Tito’s independent foreign policies and ideo-
logical heresy did not predate 1948. On the contrary, they were a result of the
Yugoslav-Soviet rupture. To survive, Yugoslavia had to master the art of play-
ing one bloc off against the other. Within a year of being exiled “into the
cold,” Yugoslav leaders began contemplating a position between the two blocs
as a permanent strategic option. The conceptualization of this new orien-
tation, which occurred much earlier than the prevailing historical interpreta-
tions suggest, was at ªrst conªned to Tito’s most trusted circle. The very real
danger of Soviet aggression did not allow Yugoslavia to risk losing the only de-
terrent it possessed—U.S. military and economic support. However, the ma-
neuvering space that was suddenly created following an astonishing and un-
foreseen Soviet initiative in the summer of 1954 for the normalization of
relations with Yugoslavia enabled Tito and his aides to embark on the imple-
mentation of their strategy of maintaining an equidistance from the two
blocs. Yugoslavia did not rush to the West in the face of Soviet aggression
only to perform an ungrateful volte-face once the threat had subsided. The
refusal to submit to foreign domination was as much behind Tito’s non-
commitment to both blocs after the normalization with Moscow as it was be-
hind his decision to oppose subjugation by his ideological mentor, Stalin, and
to ªght for survival following expulsion from the Cominform. As a U.S. intel-
ligence assessment at the time predicted, “[Tito] will continue to regard his
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interests to be best served from a ºexible position in which Yugoslavia can
achieve beneªts from both power blocs with a minimum of commitments to
either.”79
The removal of the Soviet threat was the sine qua non of Yugoslavia’s new
foreign policy strategy. But Tito realized that the only way to ensure that the
strategy could be preserved indeªnitely was by enlisting international sup-
port. Accordingly, he set sail for India and Burma in December 1954 in
search of allies. His goal was to identify and establish cooperation with like-
minded leaders with whom he could work to promote peaceful coexistence
and reduce tensions in the international system. The Yugoslavs understood
well that both were essential for their survival. Moreover, as they had learned
the hard way, a voice in debates on global issues and increased presence in in-
ternational politics that would lead to increased prestige were crucial if the
country was to resist outside pressure and overcome the isolation in which it
found itself after 1948. Tito was particularly eager to recruit Nehru as an ally.
Collaboration with a country as big and inºuential as India made it easier for
Yugoslavia to pursue the new foreign policy. During an informal conversation
with his aides and Yugoslav journalists on a train from Calcutta, he admitted:
“What would small Yugoslavia be able to do alone in this [struggle to secure
an independent position outside the Blocs] unless some big country would
join in? That is why we are looking for allies. That was the goal of this trip.
Why else would we go on such a long trip? Certainly not for me to see
tigers.”80
The amity toward India was reinforced by perceived ideological proxim-
ity. At the end of their ªnal round of talks, Tito asked Nehru to elaborate on
his vision of India’s social and political strategy. The Indian leader responded
that “[India’s] philosophy is the development toward Socialism in accordance
with India’s speciªc conditions; this development has to be carried out peace-
fully.”81 Tito was convinced that the creation of a common front with other
non-committed countries would best serve Yugoslavia’s new strategy. He be-
lieved in the strength of such a gathering to resist superpower domination
once the movement acquired the ability to inºuence global issues. This con-
viction subsequently became the driving force behind Tito’s lengthy tours of
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Africa and Asia, during which he tirelessly lobbied for the creation of the
NAM. During his ªrst trip to India and Burma, he discerned the power of
the Third World. As he admitted to U Nu,
We salute and praise the tendency of those countries, namely India, Burma, and
Indonesia, to remain outside the blocs and to be interconnected as much as pos-
sible. . . . [They] feel the need to associate with each other in order to be stronger
in their resistance to domination by others. For this reason, [Yugoslavia] is doing
its best to cooperate with those countries in Asia.82
The ªrst visit to India and Burma helped Tito to identify in the newly decolo-
nized countries of Asia an emerging force in the international system that was
able and determined to pursue policies independent of either bloc. The ªrst
venture into the Third World had a profound imprint on Tito’s perceptions
and shaped his future political engagement.
This article has introduced terms and phrases such as “non-commit-
ment,” “active peaceful coexistence,” “non-interference in the affairs of oth-
ers,” and “struggle for global peace” as the main concepts that became the
building blocks of “non-alignment.” Tito’s speech before the Indian Parlia-
ment on 21 December 1954 suggests that he had arrived in New Delhi
with surprisingly developed ideas about “peaceful co-existence” and “non-
engagement.” His ªrst trip to Asia and the discussions he had with Nehru fa-
cilitated a further, comprehensive conceptualization of these ideals. As Tito
and Nehru conªrmed seven months later in a communiqué signed at the end
of Nehru’s reciprocating visit to Belgrade, in early July 1955, the New Delhi
joint statement provided the ªrst platform for the mobilization of non-en-
gaged countries around the policy of “active peaceful coexistence” and “non-
commitment” to the two main Cold War alignments.83 The platform offered
a common identity and purpose to Third World countries. Of particular sig-
niªcance, the document appeared on the eve of Nehru’s trip to the Bandung
conference preparatory meeting in Djakarta. The joint statement invited Afri-
can and Asian countries to join Tito and Nehru in the implementation of the
principles they had promulgated as the norms in international relations.
Nehru and Tito were often accused of moralizing and of grandiloquence
for tirelessly promoting non-commitment, activism, and peaceful coexistence.
However, these concepts were a product of a judicious rationalization of the
existing international system and the adverse environment within which
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Third World countries were striving to safeguard their independence. Nehru
and Tito used these terms to articulate real political aims and goals. From
their ªrst meeting, the two leaders promoted activism and the need for non-
engaged countries to have a say on all international issues. The only way to
ensure that the voice of Third World countries would be loud enough was by
joining together in a common position on global issues. The two leaders be-
lieved that only then would their countries, as well as the Third World as
a whole, be able to maintain independence from superpower pressure—
pressure that would otherwise result in the loss of sovereignty.84 In a similar
fashion, Tito placed enormous emphasis on economic and military coopera-
tion, giving these issues a prominent place in all his talks and in the docu-
ments and statements signed during his Asian and subsequent trips. As he
ceaselessly pointed out, underdevelopment meant perpetuation of depend-
ence on colonial masters and superpowers. Mutual economic cooperation and
trade was for Third World non-engaged countries the only tool they had at
their disposal to overcome this dependency. To fend off superpower pressure
and meddling in their internal affairs, the Third World countries also had to
boost their defense capabilities. Military collaboration and self-reliance mini-
mized dependence on arms procurement from the superpowers, further limit-
ing their inºuence. Ultimately, development, modernization, and mutual co-
operation were conduits to independence.
The struggle for peace was another concept that Tito and Nehru repeat-
edly and prominently championed, and it became a central part of their ini-
tiative. Contrary to cynical interpretations, it was not used as a merely as a
rhetorical justiªcation for their policies. Rather, it was of practical sig-
niªcance, with profound political implications. Peace was also one of the pre-
cepts of their initiative that most clearly demanded “active” engagement.
They were convinced that weak Third World countries would become the
ªrst victims of a superpower confrontation, whether directly or through
proxy, as the Korean War had just demonstrated. Tito warned U Nu: “We be-
lieve that the division of the World into Blocs will, in not too distant future,
lead to a conºict. Although in the end it would be a catastrophe for the whole
World, this conºict would, ªrst and foremost, swallow and destroy small
countries.”85 A crucial justiªcation for placing the pursuit of peace at the
center of the new political philosophy was the simple fact that a nuclear war
would result in catastrophic destruction for everyone. The Third World
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countries, representing half the world’s population, had thus declared that the
future of the world, its destiny, and the right to life were not a privilege of
the superpowers alone but a fundamental right of all.
By overcoming his own ideological prejudices, Tito gave true meaning to
the concept of coexistence between countries with different ideological
afªliations and political systems. His trip to India and Burma and particularly
his conversations with Nehru helped Tito to form a new outlook on the
Third World countries and to overcome the ideologically colored preconcep-
tions he previously held. This was also the reason he was so eager to counter
allegations in the Western media that he would use the trip to India and
Burma to promote Soviet penetration in the region. As evidenced by the Yu-
goslav records of the conversations with Nehru and U Nu, Tito did precisely
the opposite. On more than one occasion, he warned his hosts that the Soviet
Union, and China in the future, aimed to dominate other countries as much
as the traditional colonial powers and the United States did. Tito understood
that his hosts, recently liberated from the colonial yoke, regarded the Soviet
Union and China as benign powers. Departing further from his own ideologi-
cal constraints, Tito did not hesitate to condemn the obstructive role played
by the domestic Communist parties, particularly the Communist-led insur-
gency in Burma. The Yugoslav became convinced that both India and Burma
were on the road to create better societies in accordance with their traditions
and speciªc conditions. He also recognized rudimentary socialist elements
within the economic and political systems these countries were trying to
build.86 Consequently, Tito urged Khrushchev during the latter’s visit to Yu-
goslavia in May and June 1955 to reconsider existing Soviet policies toward
countries such as India and Burma. He insisted that these countries repre-
sented a “reservoir of socialism,” explaining that there were clear elements of
socialism with individual characteristics in both India and Burma. Tito asked
Khrushchev to stop aiding the Communist parties there. He contended that
these parties were small and obscure and, as was the case in Burma, were
ªghting a guerrilla war against the existing government with little or no popu-
lar support.87 When U Nu visited Belgrade barely a week after Khrushchev
left, Tito could inform him of the advice he had given to Soviet leaders. He
reiterated his belief that the local Communist parties in India and Burma
were not only “distanced from their own people and are engaged in destruc-
tive activities” but have “practically joined forces with the most reactionary
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circles” in their countries.88 Tito’s ability to transcend his own ideological
afªliation made him a trusted interlocutor of the Third World leaders and a
mediator in their disputes.
The maturing of the Yugoslav approach to non-commitment that hap-
pened during the trip to India and Burma enabled Tito to enrich and ºesh
out the concept of “active peaceful coexistence.” Of particular signiªcance
was the fact that he introduced globalism and universalism to the hitherto
Asia-focused concept of neutralism. He believed that, in the era when the
Cold War order and superpower rivalry had become global, issues such as
peace, the threat of nuclear war, colonialism, development, and independence
were also global. They were of concern to all—big or small, poor or rich, de-
veloped or underdeveloped. They were also a responsibility and, more impor-
tant, a universal right belonging to all. As he stressed to U Nu, “Asia is not a
distant world to us, although we are geographically separated.”89 Tito intro-
duced universality and activism to Nehru’s regionalism and proclivity to
digniªed but passive neutralism. The rapport established between the two
leaders helped to merge neutralism and paciªsm, already inherent in tradi-
tional Indian religious and cultural identity, with European activism, nation-
alism, and individualism. This helped transform non-commitment from a
vague concept into a global phenomenon that over time attracted a growing
number of decolonized and underdeveloped countries. This was to become
Tito’s and Nehru’s lasting legacy.
The visit to India enabled Tito and Nehru to create a unique rapport that
proved beneªcial for both sides. They developed a congruence of views based
on trust and respect, admiration for each other’s political wisdom, and con-
ªdence in each other’s intellectual competence and ability to analyze and un-
derstand international issues and developments. From the outset, the two
leaders felt free to talk openly and in full conªdence. At their ªrst meeting,
Tito revealed to Nehru the existence of the secret correspondence with the
Soviet Union.90 Three days later, Tito disclosed something he had hitherto
kept only to himself and his closest aides—the fact that Moscow had just pro-
posed a meeting between the Yugoslav and Soviet leaders and that he intended
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to accept this offer, regardless of the Western reaction.91 Tito’s attentiveness,
respect, and willingness to seek Nehru’s advice, as manifested during their
meetings, were unique. Tito’s relationships with other Third World leaders in
later years, even the bond he enjoyed with Gamal Abdel Nasser, could not
match the partnership Tito forged with Nehru. During their meeting on
21 December, Tito conªded to Nehru that the Chinese had secretly ap-
proached the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow to propose the establishment of
diplomatic relations. Tito was initially determined to delay responding to the
Chinese approaches, but when Nehru advised against it, Tito promised to re-
consider his decision. On 2 January, while Tito was still in India, Yugoslav
Foreign Minister Popovib sent a response to Zhou’s telegram of 14 December
conªrming Yugoslavia’s agreement to the establishment of diplomatic rela-
tions. Yugoslav documents also conªrm that Tito and Nehru held extensive
discussions outside their formal meetings, before or after public functions, of-
ten on the terraces of their residences. The joint statement, unusually for such
a document, stressed the informal character of their exchanges. It is truly re-
markable that two statesmen of such divergent upbringing and such different
cultural and ideological backgrounds could have shared so much in common.
What had brought together an Indian patrician, educated at the elitist Har-
row and Cambridge University and committed to parliamentarian democ-
racy, and a peasant-turned-metal-worker from remote Zagorje who was a
committed Communist-internationalist? How could two such different indi-
viduals ªnd a cause they would jointly and so determinedly endeavor to ful-
ªll? The only possible response is also the one that best explains the appeal of
their initiative to so many across the Third World: the true universality and
timelessness of the goals and principles the two leaders committed themselves
to defend and implement. The unique rapport between Tito and Nehru,
forged during the Yugoslav leader’s ªrst visit to India, became a driving force
in the creation and existence of the NAM until Nehru’s death in 1964.
Finally, what can explain Tito’s charisma, and why was he so well received
in the Third World from the very beginning? This question is often posed
with regard to Yugoslavia and its president’s role in the creation of the NAM,
and several explanations may be offered. First, Tito’s carried with him the dis-
tinctive aura of the leader of a successful resistance and national liberation
movement, something that appealed to Third World people and politicians
alike. Many of them had only recently emerged from an anti-colonial struggle
or war of liberation. Tito also had the ability to listen and to award his inter-
locutors with the attention and respect they craved as the leaders of newly lib-
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91. Memorandum of the conversation between the President and the Prime Minister of India,
J. Nehru, in New Delhi, 21 December 1954, in AJBT, KPR, I-2/4-2.
erated countries. He could articulate their desire for independence and
dignity because he shared it. He was sincere, and they recognized it. Further-
more, he came from a small country that had dared to stand up to a super-
power and had emerged unscathed. The myth of David and Goliath never
ceases to inspire the weak and the deprived.92 Being independent of both su-
perpowers, Tito could freely voice his views on any international issue. More
importantly, he was seen as someone who was successfully promoting and de-
fending his country’s own interests. Within a short period of time Tito had
successfully led a devastated and economically underdeveloped country to-
ward modernization and commendable economic development and military
strength. Last but not least, Tito championed the new political, cultural, and
racial awareness toward the Asian and African countries. This was even more
accentuated because he came from Europe, home to the traditional colonial
powers. In a way, he was the ªrst white European who did not come to subju-
gate and arrived instead as an equal, professing independence and mutual
respect.
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92. Association with this parable did not escape Alvin Z. Rubinstein when describing Tito’s reception
in Burma. See Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World, p. 58.
